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Abstract: Rapid globalization has increased the need and opportunity for inter-
actions between people from different cultural backgrounds. Experience is often 
considered the best teacher and experiences with cross-cultural interactions 
represent important opportunities to learn to deal with differences. Drawing on a 
collection of 260 cases, this contribution argues that even when people enter into 
cross-cultural interactions with the intention of learning new ways of seeing and 
doing things, they often draw conclusions that make them unreceptive to 
information that might contradict what they already think. Thus, learning from 
experience can be dangerous when it inhibits inquiry and closes off new 
knowledge. This contribution illustrates the kinds of “dangerous learning” we have 
encountered in our research and presents strategies of critical self-reflection and 
interaction to generate shared understandings of situations, desired outcomes, and 
appropriate actions.  
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung: Erfahrungen gelten als wichtige Lernressource, dieser 
Beitrag hingegen stellt anhand ausgewählter Fallstudien über interkulturelle 
Interaktionen dar, wie Erfahrungen dem Lernen auch im Wege stehen können. Die 
Untersuchung zeigt auf, dass auch Akteure, die sich bewusst in interkulturelle 
Situationen begeben, um neue Sichtweisen zu erlernen, auf eingeübte Interpreta-
tionsmuster und Lösungsansätzen zurückgreifen, sobald kulturelle Situationen 
ihren eigenen Erfahrungen und Vorstellungen widersprechen. Somit wird das un-
reflektierte Lernen aus Erfahrungen zu einer gefährlichen Strategie, da es die 
Überprüfung der Annahmen verhindert und neue Erkenntnisse ausschließt. Die 
Konsequenzen sind sowohl auf individueller wie auch auf organisationaler Ebene 
von Bedeutung, da Schlussfolgerungen aus Erfahrungslernen oft unkritisch als 
handlungsleitend für zukünftige Interaktionen im Organisationsgedächtnis gespei-
chert werden. Dieser Beitrag verdeutlicht, wie „dangerous learning“ zu Stande 
kommt und entwickelt interaktive Lernstrategien, um dieser Gefahr entgegen-
zuwirken.   
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Overcoming dangerous learning:  
The role of critical reflection in cross-cultural interactions 
Rapid globalization has increased the need and opportunity for interactions 
between people from different cultural backgrounds. Experience is often con-
sidered the best teacher and experiences with cross-cultural interactions represent 
important opportunities to learn to deal with differences. But what do people 
actually learn from such experiences? This contribution1 argues that even when 
people enter into cross-cultural interactions with the intention of learning new ways 
of seeing and doing things, they often draw conclusions that make them 
unreceptive to information that might contradict what they already think. Thus, 
learning from experience can be dangerous when it inhibits inquiry and closes off 
new knowledge.   
 
The goal of this contribution is to illustrate the kinds of “dangerous learning” we 
have encountered in our research and how to overcome them. We draw on our 
work with international management students to explore how people learn from 
their experience in difficult cross-cultural interactions. Our research suggests that 
dangerous learning is not the result of stupidity or lack of cultural interest. Rather, 
people have a hard time putting a desire to be open-minded into action when 
encountering cultural misunderstandings and conflict. Indeed, some of the most 
dangerous learning occurs when the participants allow their previous knowledge to 
violate their own values of openness and reason.   
 
We shall also argue that overcoming dangerous learning requires an ability to 
employ critical self-reflection that engages others in a process of "negotiating 
reality" (Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003a and b). Critical self-reflection in cross-
cultural situations involves gaining insights into one’s own thinking and emotional 
responses and understanding how one’s own culture influences expectations and 
interpretation. Negotiating reality entails combining critical self-reflection with 
                                            
1  A shorter version of this article will appear in a publication resulting from The SALTA Project of 
the National Institute of Working Life, Stockholm: Productive Reflection and Learning at Work, 
Edited by D. Boud, P. Cressey, P. Doherty. Routledge 
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inquiry into the perspectives and logics that underlie the behavior and expectations 
of the other participants. It opens up new ways of seeing a situation, expands the 
range of potential responses and helps people become more effective at 
generating shared understandings of situations, desired outcomes, and appropriate 
actions.   
Exploring cases to reveal dangerous learning 
We have collected 260 cases written by students for a graduate course on cross-
cultural management at a German business school. The purpose of our course 
was to help the participants learn to “recognize and use cultural differences as a 
resource for learning and for the design of effective action in specific contexts” 
(Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003a: 1). Our focus was on stimulating the partici-
pants to explore and express how their cultural backgrounds shaped their 
assumptions and perceptions, rather than teaching them about the attributes of 
foreign cultures. While not denying that it is useful to learn about other cultures, we 
are skeptical of cultural adaptation strategies for cultural interactions, in the sense 
of knowing enough about different cultures to "intentionally shift into a different 
cultural frame of reference" and modify behavior to fit the norms of another culture 
(Bennett 1998: 28). The intensive course was designed to lead the students 
through a process of gaining insights into their past behavior by re-visiting their 
thought processes and their emotional responses with their peers, followed by the 
opportunity to redesign and try out new approaches to empower them to become 
more effective in future interactions (for a more detailed description of the course 
see Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003b).   
 
The cases were based on the personal experience of the students and illustrated 
their attempts to handle difficult cross-cultural situations. Prior to the course, the 
students received a standard case-writing format that included a brief background 
to the problem situation, their intended strategy for dealing with it, and a recon-
structed dialogue to illustrate how this strategy was put into action. The dialogues 
were written in a two-column format (Argyris 1982; Argyris & Schön 1974, 1978). In 
the right hand column the case-writers reconstructed the actual words spoken or 
 7 
actions taken as closely as possible. In the left hand column they recorded their 
thoughts and feelings during the dialogue. To close the paper, they noted the out-
come and commented on the learning they drew from the experience.  
 
The course participants had worked or studied all around the world, and they re-
ported on difficulties working in cross-cultural teams, relating to superiors and 
clients, managing subordinates, interacting with peers in shared housing or at so-
cial events, and carrying out everyday business transactions. Most of the students 
expressed a strong interest in learning from their opportunities to work and study 
abroad. They saw their internships in foreign subsidiaries and semesters in foreign 
universities as creating experiences from which they would gain insights into 
different cultures, different ways of seeing and doing things. Yet, when we read the 
cases to discover what the students had learned from their experiences, we found 
that, when the students faced the challenge of achieving performance targets, their 
learning goals often slipped away. We combed through the cases for evidence of 
moments when the students stopped to reflect on their reasoning, their behavior, 
and their conclusions about how to improve their cross-cultural skills.  
 
Almost none of the students engaged in a process of critical self-reflection when 
they encountered conflict and misunderstanding. Instead, they used their existing 
mindsets to interpret the situation and to define the solution. The power of their 
knowledge and past experience was so strong that they disregarded or misinter-
preted information that could have contradicted their views and provided them with 
guidance. In almost every case they cast doubt on the logic, ability, or values of the 
other person or people involved in the situation, rather than questioning their own 
assumptions, thinking, or behavior.   
 8 
What the students learned from their experience 
In order to illustrate dangerous learning, we shall first take a close look at one case 
study, including excerpts from the two-column dialogue, written by student called 
Ralf2. While this case study is typical of what many students wrote, it is not 
intended to be an average or representative case. It reflects some of the features 
and consequences of dangerous learning, and we use brief summaries of other 
cases in order to illustrate additional dimensions and fill out our argument. 
 
Ralf was a German member of a small project team analyzing a company in 
Sydney, Australia. He was particularly happy that the team included Alex, “an 
intelligent and extremely motivated” Malaysian member who had been in Australia 
quite a while and could be relied on for local knowledge. Ralf and Johannes had 
only recently arrived from Germany (the team included another member whose 
nationality and role were not specified in the case study). Shortly before the report 
was to be presented, Ralf was horrified to discover that Alex had a totally different 
conception of how to present the team’s findings and conclusions than the 
approach Ralf and Johannes had been trained to use in Germany.  
 
The following is a section from the dialogue that Ralf presented to illustrate how he 
dealt with this situation: 
                                            
2  The names of the participants in the cases have been changed. 
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My thoughts and feelings 
 
 
What was said 
... actually I think it is the worst 
report I have ever read.... 
 
 
 
... what is a report good for if you 
talk much more about the analysis 
than the recommendations. In 
which part is your client more 
interested in? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
... at least I hope we can reduce 
some damage, by making the 
report at least look good and 
readable. 
 
 
Ralf: Hi Alex, I read the report and I think 
all in all you two…did quite a good job. But 
the report somehow is longer than I 
expected. 
 
Alex: we had to put in some additional 
contributions about our findings. We 
thought it necessary to reflect exhaustively 
what the various workers at Company X 
we interviewed told us. I talked to our 
professor and she said it would be 
advisable to do this way as the whole 
project is politically sensitive. 
(…) 
(…) 
Ralf: O.k. I see the importance of adapting 
the report to the liking of our professor. But 
nevertheless I would like – with the help of 
Johannes – to look over the finished report 
and apply some minor changes. You know 
for “us Germans” the formal style is pretty 
important. Thus, we would like to use 1.5 
line space, rephrase some headlines and 
so on. 
 
It was too late to change the content, but the two Germans worked intensely to 
reformat the report to meet their standards. Ralf described the final report as "one 
big compromise for all participants," with the two Germans not liking the content 
and Alex not liking the appearance. Ralf concluded from this case that he could not 
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count on foreign team members to meet his standards. Therefore, he believed that 
in future he would have to take much more control from the very beginning.   
 
What characterized dangerous learning in this, and other, instances?  
1. The case writers' reasoning and behavior closed off, or severely limited, 
their understanding of the other stakeholders' expectations. There was 
actually plenty of information available that might have helped Ralf break out 
of his prior ways of thinking and learn something new. As illustrated by the 
dialogue, Ralf overlooked the explanation provided by Alex. He did not take 
on board the fact that the professor based her advice on her political 
understanding of the situation. Neither of these two items of information 
stimulated him to question his sense of what the standards should be. And 
he insisted on formatting the paper according to German business school 
style while emphasizing the importance of attending to the client—who was 
not German.   
 
2. The case-writers’ reasoning and behavior prevented them from discovering, 
and bringing to bear, the knowledge resources implicit in the diversity of a 
multi-cultural team. Despite the fact that Ralf had a positive impression of 
Alex and stated that he valued Alex's knowledge of the local culture, he was 
unable to put those thoughts into action. Ralf treated the alternative set of 
standards as inferior rather than inquiring into the differences between them.   
 
In another case, Rajiv, an Indian, was assigned by his British superior to 
lead a small project team that included an American man and a Japanese 
woman. Anticipating cross-cultural conflict, he consistently applied the 
concept of Madhyapantha (the Middle Path) to force "compromises" when-
ever a disagreement arose. Thus, he quickly looked for solutions that would 
keep both sides "happy". Although he wrote that he had achieved "cultural 
synergy", the case data indicated that he imposed his own perspective ("the 
Middle Path") rather than allowing any conflict among the different 
perspectives. He neither questioned his own strategy nor inquired into the 
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differences among his colleagues as a way of discovering new ways of 
seeing and doing things.    
 
3. The case writers confirmed their beliefs that their own way was the best way 
even when results fell below expectations. Under pressure, and in the 
aftermath of the situation, Ralf remained firmly convinced that he knew the 
best way to do something even though there was evidence to the contrary.  
 
In a different case, Peter faced a big challenge during his internship in the 
Indonesian subsidiary of the German company: to persuade senior local 
managers to provide information and introduce new reporting tools. He was 
aware of the importance assigned to age and experience in the local culture, 
but took it upon himself to get people to understand the German mode of 
expertise-based authority. After initial attempts to show respect for the 
senior manager, Peter could not decode the polite responses he received, 
so he decided to be more direct. He concluded, “definitely my way to start 
this was not the best way to do it. At the following meetings I took a more 
authoritarian role and the results were better.” He did not learn how to 
communicate effectively with the local management, and he suspects that 
the reporting tool was discontinued a little while later because it was not well 
adapted to the management processes. 
 
4. The case writers employed knowledge about cultural differences to explain 
away problems rather than to explore, or solve, them. Paradoxically, prior 
cultural knowledge may actually contribute to dangerous learning. For 
example, Michael had prepared for his internship in the Japanese subsidiary 
of a German bank. He wanted to produce high quality work for his female 
Japanese boss, who was very busy and had little time for him. He was 
frustrated by the fact that she criticized what he delivered but he did not feel 
that it would be culturally appropriate to address his concerns. He 
“remembered from my Japanese language and culture preparation class 
that open discussions of conflicts are highly uncommon in Japan and I 
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certainly did not want to break this rule.” He did not learn how to achieve the 
necessary clarification and remained frustrated.   
  
5. The case writers violated their own deeply held values while remaining 
unaware of these inner contradictions. Maria, a German, was proud of the 
way she obtained support for her preferred solution to a team assignment 
during her semester abroad in the U.S. The group, consisting of four women 
(a German, a Danish, an American and a Puerto Rican), and an American 
man, had to develop a strategy to resolve an international policy dilemma. 
She was sure that the male group member, who had served in the U.S. 
marines, would seek a strategy based on military intervention, but as a 
pacifist she could not condone the use of force. By talking with each of the 
other group members before the team meeting, she ensured they would 
share her diplomacy-based solution. Not until she discussed the situation 
half a year later in the cross-cultural competence course we led in Germany 
did she realize that she had seriously compromised the values she prized. 
By amassing a coalition for the diplomatic solution, she had used force to 
achieve her pacifist goals. In addition, she had lost an opportunity to learn 
from the team member whose views she disagreed with.   
 
Experience and dangerous learning 
Experience is often considered the most common and most powerful source of 
learning to become more effective in dealing with the challenges of daily life.  
People learn from their own, direct experience and through that of others (Bandura 
1977). Kolb (1984) conceptualized learning from experience as a cycle that 
encompasses experiencing, reflecting, conceptualizing, and planning (see Figure 
1). Kolb's model implies that these four stages follow one another in a natural 
fashion and that each cycle expands upon and improves existing knowledge.   
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Figure 1: Kolb’s Cycle of Experiential Learning 
 
Concrete
Experience
Active
Experimentation
Abstract
Conceptionalization
Reflective
Observation
4
1
2
3
 
 
 
Source: D. Kolb (1984) Experiential Learning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Prentice Hall: 21 
 
Dangerous learning occurs when people move between concrete experience and 
active experimentation, short-circuiting the learning cycle, with little or no time or 
attention devoted to reflection and abstract conceptualization. The problem is that, 
because people are rarely aware of not having completed the learning cycle, they 
do not suspend their learning and wait for an opportunity to collect, interpret and 
apply sufficient information about the situation and their behavior. They draw 
conclusions from the experience anyway. Dangerous learning may involve what 
behaviorists have called “superstitious learning” (March & Olsen 1976; Skinner 
1948), in which pigeons, people, and organizations incorrectly attribute environ-
mental responses to their actions. The learning is dangerous because it limits 
individuals’ ability to expand their repertoires while leaving them with the sense that 
they have learned from experience. 
 
Such short-circuited learning cycles are encountered frequently in management 
(Honey & Mumford 1986; Honey 1991). The problem lies partially in the kind of 
automatic thinking and behavior that enables competent action in most situations 
(Friedman & Lipshitz 1992). Automatic thinking and behavior is possible because 
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people possess "theories of action" (Argyris & Schön 1974, 1978) or "mental 
models" (Senge 1990) that guide perception, the interpretation of information, and 
the selection of appropriate action. Theories of action are largely shaped by a 
person's cultural repertoires; that is, the cumulative influence of various cultures on 
a person's learning from experience. Theories of action enable people to quickly 
read and respond to situations. They represent a kind of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 
1967) that enables people to perform everyday tasks – from tying shoes to 
managing a project – with little or no conscious thought.  
 
The problem is that these same structures lead people to perceive what they al-
ready know (Weick 1979), making it difficult to pick up cues suggesting the need 
for a radical rethinking of interpretations or behavior. Thus, in cross-cultural con-
flicts, people's reactions are rarely "Maybe I should reflect on how I may be 
misinterpreting the situation?" or "Maybe I should consider the logic in the other's 
person's arguments or actions?" The obvious fact of cultural differences is used to 
explain away the conflict rather than reflect on it. As a consequence, individuals 
become less receptive to information and feedback from their environments, ma-
king it difficult for them to learn new ways of interpreting reality and acting on them.  
 
The costs of the dangerous learning were high for our students. They admitted that 
their solutions were often not particularly good, and they usually had to bear the 
largest portion of the work. In many instances, they sacrificed their values, quality 
standards, potential relationships, and leisure time. Until stimulated to reflect self-
critically, the experience seemed to teach them that they had done the only thing 
possible, so that next time they were likely to do the same, maybe even more 
intensely. 
Two kinds of reflection  
The foregoing cases and analysis point to the dangers of processes of experiential 
learning which short-circuit Kolb's cycle, and to the need for promoting critical self-
reflection in cross-cultural interactions. We looked for evidence of two kinds of 
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reflection in the cases: "reflection on action" and "reflection-in-action." Donald 
Schön described the distinction between them as follows: 
We may reflect on (italics in original) action, thinking back on what we have 
done in order to discover how our knowing-in-action may have contributed to 
an unexpected outcome. We may do so after the fact … or we may pause in 
the midst of an action … In either case, our reflection has no direct connection 
to present action. Alternatively, we may reflect in the midst of an action 
without interrupting it … during which we can still make a difference to the 
situation at hand – our thinking serves to reshape what we are doing while we 
are doing it. I shall say, in cases like this, that we reflect-in-action (italics in 
original). (Schön 1987, p. 26) 
Reflection-in-action becomes important when a person's almost automatic 
repertoires for action fail to produce the intended results.   
 
Skilled reflection-in-action means experiencing these moments of blockage or 
failure as a puzzle in which there is something unique, unclear, or not fully under-
stood in the situation. It also means turning thought back on itself so that people 
can reconsider their perceptions of situations, their assumptions, their goals, and/or 
their action strategies. Reflection-in-action is focused on a specific practice context 
and never ends with insight alone. It involves action to transform or “make 
something” of the context (Schön 1987, p. 31). Schön described the potential be-
nefits of the informal interplay of “reflection on” and “reflection in” action: 
… our reflection on our past reflection-in-action may indirectly shape our 
future action … As I think back on my experience…, I may consolidate my 
understanding of the problem or invent a better or more general solution to it. 
If I do, my present reflection on my earlier reflection-in-action begins a 
dialogue of thinking and doing through which I become … more skillful … 
these several levels and kinds of reflection play important roles in the 
acquisition of artistry. (Schön 1987, p. 31) 
These two kinds of reflection are different and distinguishable, and they are both 
important for learning. 
 
The two-column dialogues provide insights into the problematic nature of the 
students' reflection-in-action. They almost never reacted to uncertainty, conflicts, 
and misunderstandings by questioning their own assumptions and exploring new 
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ways of interpreting situations and acting upon them. They tended to remain fo-
cused on their initial objectives, only changing the tactics used to achieve them.  
 
The retrospective evaluation of the outcome of the situation provided data on their 
reflection on action. The group work during the course itself also provided an 
opportunity for reflection on action, as each student’s case was analyzed in turn, 
creating opportunities to see what had happened in fresh ways and to envision 
different potential responses for the case writer. In reflecting on action, most of the 
students wrote or said that they had learned from their experience but most of 
these lessons were simply explanations of the problem. Few of the students went 
so far as to specify how this learning would help them act more effectively in a 
similar situation the future. Indeed, most of these "lessons" confirmed pre-existing 
knowledge, ways of doing things, and closed off options for learning new ways of 
thinking and acting. In addition, the students generally located the problem in 
others rather than in themselves. In many cases the students simply concluded 
that they had had no choice, which is a feature of dangerous learning.   
 
There were exceptions, though surprisingly few, to this lack of critical self-reflec-
tion. A very small number of students wrote about two phases in their cases, des-
cribing how they had recognized a problem in a situation, given it some thought, 
and then tried a new approach to dealing with it. For example, a French intern in a 
Japanese company in Paris had a Chinese team member to work with. Louise 
expected that the Chinese colleague's foreign perspective would be useful for the 
latter stage of the project, in which they would be expected to come up with new 
suggestions. However, she was confident that her approach to the initial stage, 
analyzing the market, was “a routine task” that “should not raise any cultural 
problem" because a "Chinese business student from a business school would have 
learned the same things and done the same work.”   
 
Louise later discovered that it had been an error to assume that her team 
member’s “yes” had meant full agreement, leading to an embarrassing situation 
when a senior manager asked for data that neither of them had collected. 
Recognizing that she “had done a very bad job during the first meeting” with her 
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Chinese colleague, she decided to revise her approach to the teamwork. In a 
subsequent meeting she posed questions designed to discover how her colleague 
saw the purpose of the study and the procedure for carrying it out. They came up 
with a new approach, agreed on dividing up the task, and successfully completed 
the analytical part of the study. This experience stood them in good stead while 
working through their different perspectives during the creative part of the study 
and their manager was satisfied with the result.  
 
In the reflection section of their papers some of the students recognized the traps 
they had fallen into. Revisiting the situation with a certain distance, they were able 
to reflect self-critically on their assumptions, interpretations, and behavior. They 
raised questions about their performance and exhibited skill in identifying 
contradictions, gaps, and puzzles in their own thinking and behavior. They revised 
their original conclusions and expressed a desire to try different approaches. For 
example, Michael was full of questions about what he could have done better, how 
he could have discovered ways of communicating more effectively with his boss, 
and how to deal with similar situations in the future.  
 
Judging from our analyses of the two-column dialogues, less than a handful of 
case-writers demonstrated any ability to effectively practice reflection-in-action 
during their attempts to solve a cross-cultural problem.  Maria was surprised, and 
deeply disturbed, when she was made aware of how she had used force (creating 
a political coalition) rather than reason in dealing with disagreement. Rajiv admitted 
that he had failed "in coming out of my shell of possessiveness of my leadership 
position." He also admitted that he had been doubtful from the beginning about 
achieving the results he had promised to his superior, but had kept these doubts to 
himself because he "was more concerned about agreeing to what the boss said 
rather than being honest and telling him that the target might not be achieved."   
 
For most of the students, the discovery of alternative interpretations of the situation 
and action strategies came only through active engagement in the course. They 
needed help from others, as well as a set of conceptual tools, to challenge the 
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conclusions they had drawn from the experience and to open themselves to 
exploring different responses. 
Overcoming dangerous learning: Negotiating reality  
Avoiding the trap of dangerous learning requires the ability to experience 
uncertainty, or “not knowing”, in order to let new meanings emerge. It also involves 
an ability to engage others in a process of inquiry, experimentation, and joint 
reflection – often in the very midst of conflict. We have named these abilities 
"negotiating reality", which we define as “the process whereby individuals generate 
an effective strategy of action in a cross-cultural interaction by making themselves 
and each other aware of their culturally-shaped interpretations and responses to a 
given situation and expanding their repertoire appropriately” (Berthoin Antal & 
Friedman 2003a: 16). Negotiating reality is grounded in three fundamental values 
or beliefs: (1) as human beings, all people are of equal importance and worthy of 
equal respect; (2) as cultural beings, people differ because they possess different 
repertoires of ways of seeing and doing things, and (3) the repertoire of no 
individual or group merits a priori superiority. Dangerous learning almost always 
involves a violation, though often unintentional, of one of these values.3    
 
The goal of our course was to help the students learn this cross-cultural 
competency if they wished to do so. It is beyond the scope of this contribution to 
describe the various components of negotiating reality and the learning process we 
designed for acquiring these skills (see Berthoin Antal & Friedman, 2003b for a 
detailed description of this process). We have found that when people inquire into 
other people’s logics with real curiosity and appreciation, they are likely to discover 
valuable insights and alternative interpretations that will expand or correct their 
own perceptions of a situation. The information they gain may be useful in 
redefining the goals or strategies.   
 
Equally importantly, by sharing the reasoning behind their thinking with others 
(which we term ‘advocacy’), people create the possibility that their counterparts will 
                                            
3  We are indebted to Tanja Busch for drawing our attention to this point. 
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also gain fresh perspectives with which they may adjust their definition of the 
situation, goals, and strategies. The dual process of inquiry and advocacy makes it 
more likely that people will avoid or clarify misunderstandings, create a shared 
image of reality, and generate collaborative action.  
 
Prior knowledge of a culture is a valuable resource in negotiating reality when it is 
used for posing questions, but impedes the ability of individuals to engage in 
negotiating reality when it ends exploration. Instead of imposing generalized 
knowledge about cultural differences on a situation, people need to use it as a 
basis for "reflective transfer" (Schön & Rein 1994), guiding inquiry into what is truly 
unique, different, puzzling, and important in this specific instance. Research on 
international managers confirms that such a learning stance distinguishes 
particularly effective managers (Ratiu 1983).   
Conclusions  
The idea of dangerous learning should lead to a healthy skepticism when people 
claim to have learned from experience in cross-cultural situations. Furthermore, the 
paradoxical finding from our work about the high risk of dangerous learning among 
individuals who had made an effort to inform themselves of a culture in advance 
signals the need for careful course design in cross-cultural management. It is 
dangerous when cultural knowledge is used in a way that impedes people’s ability 
to collect more information and respond in a new way to the situation. Unfortunate-
ly, in almost all the cases, the students imposed their prior cultural knowledge upon 
the new situation and used it to explain the actions of others and their own 
frustrations. These explanations became an end point of analysis rather than an 
opening for inquiry. The courses the case writers had attended and the culture 
books they had read had not taught them to test their explanations openly with the 
other people.  
 
There is no reason to assume that dangerous learning is limited to cross-cultural 
situations. This contribution has attempted to show that there is a high risk that 
what people call learning from experience is often actually a confirmation what they 
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already know. Instead of using their existing knowledge and expertise as a point of 
departure for inquiry, they tend to impose this information on their interpretations of 
reality and cling to familiar strategies. In many instances, they react in these ways 
despite their intention to learn from others.  
 
Our findings about dangerous learning suggest directions for further inquiry. It is 
particularly important to understand the role organizational conditions play in rein-
forcing dangerous learning or promoting negotiating reality. For example, structure 
and power relations may influence the openness of individuals to critical self-
reflection. In many of the cases, time pressures appeared to be a factor in the 
short-circuiting of the learning cycle. Thus, it is possible that the particular ways in 
which time is perceived and structured in organizations is more, or less, conducive 
to reflection.  
 
Finally, the problem of dangerous learning at the individual level raises question 
about organizational learning as well. Given the rhetoric about globalization and 
diversity, what do organizations actually learn from contact with different ways of 
thinking and acting? Our findings suggest that programs intended to enhance 
effectiveness in cross-cultural interactions may unwittingly inhibit exploration and 
learning. When organizational actors draw conclusions from dangerous learning, 
they may reinforce shared mental models rather than questioning and adjusting 
them in light of new environmental demands. In addition, the features of dangerous 
learning may actually become embedded in organizational routines and standard 
operating procedures so that they impede experimentation and the discovery of 
new organizational responses. More attention, therefore, needs to be paid to the 
connection between dangerous learning at the individual and organizational levels.  
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